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Jensen: Lender Recoupment for Oil Not In Place

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER I

Realizing the potentiality for the mishandling of oil and gas
production mortgages and other secured lending devices involved in
acquiring expansion and acquisition funds, Mr. Jensen analyzes the
liability of the engineer making the oil and gas reserve estimates upon
which such loans are based and indicates the significant problems and
anticipated court resolution.

LENDER RECOUPMENT FOR OIL
NOT IN PLACE
Donald L. Jensen*

T

recent evanescence of mortgaged salad oil and fertilizer tanks should prompt lenders to re-examine an even
more volatile security, oil and gas reserves.
HE

A primary source of acquisition and expansion funds
utilized by the oil industry is oil and gas reserves. Acquisitions are generally molded upon the ABC' pattern for tax
purposes' while working capital is derived through production mortgages covering numerous properties scattered
throughout the area of interest of the borrower. The security
supporting both the production mortgage and the ABC oil
payment is the oil and gas reserves assigned to the mortgagor's
or seller's productive property by evaluating petroleum
engineers.
Production mortgages follow a more or less typical pattern. In the usual instance the mortgagor owns producing
properties and varying interests in numerous fields in several
states. The mortgagor expends proportionately large amounts
of capital in the exploration and development of its properties and its primary assets are oil and gas reserves in the
Legal Counsel Husky Oil Company; B.S., University of Wyoming; L.L.B.,
University of Wyoming, 1956.
1. Typically A owns the producing oil and gas reserves which are conveyed to
B. In the conveyance A reserves an oil payment which is conveyed to C;
C in turn pledges the oil payment to a lender.
2. For a discussion of tax advantages of the ABC transaction see 2 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 423.11 (2d ed. 1964).
*
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ground and associated producing equipment. To obtain capital, the mortgagor pledges its reserves from time to time to
various banks and lending institutions. In support of its
loan application, the mortgagor furnishes the lender a reserwe
evaluation report prepared by a reputable engineering firm
of the mortgagor's selection, or in the case of smaller loans,
the borrower furnishes reservoir information to the bank's
engineers. Assuming agreement as to the loan value of the
security, i.e., the discounted present worth of the reserves
in the ground, the mortgagor then furnishes the lender title
opinions covering the producing properties together with
various security instruments.
The financial and oil industries have viewed the security
instruments necessary to protect the oil industry lender as
being conventional in nature; however, the typical deed of
trust or mortgage contains numerous industry type covenants.
A divergence of opinion exists concerning assignments of
production. Many lenders demand a present assignment of
either all or a portion of the hydrocarbons produced from
the mortgaged leaseholds and a like assignment of all proceeds received which are attributable to the sale of such
hydrocarbons-other lenders rely upon a covenant to assign
upon a future request by the lender. As an adjunct to the
former procedure, transfer or division orders are executed
by the borrower and lender with the lender usually disclaiming any warranty of title.' This type of documentation places
a duty of accounting upon the lender. A duty which, in the
case of numerous producing interests, can become quite onerous. Also, this method of documentation may expose the
lender to the extra hazards of a good faith conversion.4
The present tendency of lenders is to not demand a
present assignment of production but to rely upon a covenant
by the borrower to assign the production from the mortgaged
3. The effectiveness of this type of disclaimer is subject to question. In Pan
Am. Petro. Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
926 (1964), a lender was held liable on a conversion theory to a leaseholder
for oil illegally produced from a cross-country well bore. The transient well
bore bottomed on Pan American's lease but produced from equipment located
upon adjacent property leased by a Mr. Long. Mr. Long mortgaged the
property to Southwestern Life Insurance Company (SWL) who executed
division orders with a disclaimer "without warranty of any kind either
expressed or implied." The court found this language to be of little significance.
4. Pan Am. Petro. Corp. v. Long, supra note 3.
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property to the lender upon receipt by the borrower of a
written request from the lender to do so. In the absence
of a present assignment, the borrower continues to receive
all proceeds from the numerous pipeline purchasers and
remits periodic payments to the lender. Division or transfer
orders are not executed by the lender until default and such
proce'dure should isolate the lender from the conversion theory
noted above.
The lending documents may require a periodic oil and
gas reserve review by a petroleum engineering firm to reaffirm the amount and value of the lender's security interest.
Also, the borrower may request such a review by the evaluating firm from time to time if the reserves possess a long
productive life since the present net worth of reserves to be
produced in the future increases each succeeding year and
the borrower may be able to increase its borrowing base.
Reserve evaluation plays a similarly vital role in the
ABC transaction. Company A, the selling company, will
either provide reservoir data to all interested buyers or, as
in the case of the larger sales, will obtain a reserve report
by a reputable petroleum engineering firm. The ultimate
sale price of Company A will reflect to a large extent the
value placed upon its oil and gas reserves. Company C, the
oil payment purchaser, may use the same reserve report in
obtaining financing for the production payment.
In both transactions, the lender is dependent upon the
value and the presence of the oil and gas reserves as represented by the evaluating engineering firm. In production
mortgage situations, the borrower may not possess additional
assets which could be reached for the indebtedness should
the production fail. In the ABC pattern, C may be a tax
exempt charitable corporation with no appreciable additional
assets, or C may be a tax effacing corporation formed for
use as an oil payment vehicle.
The evaluation procedures of reservoir engineering firms
encompass a perimeter from cursory to as detailed as the
information concerning the characteristics of the properties
permits. Historically, reserve estimates have been grossly
understated and the lenders grossly over-secured. In the past
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968
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few years, however, engineers have tended to become less
cautious and more realism has crept into their evaluations.
The accumulation of data which will ultimately determine
the lending value of a particular property commences with
the initial discovery well. If the well-site geologist is extremely perceptive or is vested with extreme good luck, or both,
a large amount of the information necessary for a proper
evaluation will be derived through the drilling, testing, and
completion of the discovery well. In many instances however,
management of the company, upon being advised of a probable producing wildcat, may prefer to discontinue drilling
very near the top of the potential producing formation to
obviate the possibility of destroying the well.
Therefore, with one completed well the information available to the evaluating petroleum engineer may be minimal.
The engineer may, however, hazard an estimate based upon
such available minimal information as to probable reservoir
characteristics. From this estimate and with a possible twinge
of conscience, the engineer will assign initial reserves to
the well. These assigned reserves become, in the semantics
of the profession, "proven" reserves. The adjacent spacing
units are endowed with nomenclature of being "probable"
reserves and the spacing units once removed become "possible" reserves. As each successive well is drilled, more information will become known and the engineer will be better
advised in the assignment of reserves. However, there are
few developing fields in which a sufficient amount of accurate
information is available to foster a proper evaluation.
The reservoir engineering firm is faced with multiple
and unusual variables in its evaluations. It must consider
elements such as porosity, permeability, gravity, pressure,
volume, drive mechanism, formation characteristics and
numerous other factors in arriving at its estimate of the
amount of hydrocarbons owned by the borrower.' These
variables are compounded by the various productive areas in
which the borrower owns producing interests.
After the evaluator has established a theoretical amount
5. For a discussion of evaluation procedures, see Polumbus, Techniques of
Evaluating Oil Properties,2 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 887 (1956).
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of reserves, the next task is to assign a present value to such
oil and gas in place. Again variables are present, such as the
future price of crude, projected lifting costs, and possible
rates of production, as effected by the vicissitudes of the
nations economy.
As an adjunct to consideration of the formational and
economic variables, it would seem prudent to add the external
influences that may effect the firm's evaluation. Engineering
firms in production mortgage and oil payment situations are
very often retained and paid by the selling or mortgagor
companies and may be subject to a variety of influences. It
would also seem entirely possible that an evaluator would
be inclined to accept the veracity of information supplied to
it by the proposed mortgagor or seller in many areas rather
than obtaining the same information at a disproportionate
cost from outside sources. In addition, there are numerous
small producing fields in which the information necessary
for a proper evaluation may be solely within the possession
of the mortgagor or seller, who may elect to withhold detrimental information.
It is a tribute to the petroleum engineering profession
that lender losses have been so limited in the past; but perhaps, in view of the miasmatic history of fertilizer tanks and
salad oil, it would be timely to consider a lender's opportunity
for recoupment for incorrect evaluation of oil and gas reserves. This is particularly so if we consider how much easier
it is to measure salad oil in tanks or to count fertilizer equipment in use than it is to measure oil and gas in the ground.
The question of a petroleum engineer's liability for misstated oil and gas reserves appears to be most easily considered by the utilization of a hypothetical situation. Therefore, assume that A corporation requested a reserve evaluation
from Cursory Engineers. A advised Cursory that the purpose
of the evaluation was an intended sale of A's producing
properties. Upon completion of the reserve study, Cursory
furnished A 50 counterparts of its evaluation. The study
contained a certificate to the effect that Cursory evaluated
A's producing properties based upon information supplied
by A and that Cursory utilized sound and accepted engineering practices in its evaluation.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968
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A corporation delivered the reserve reports to potential
buyers. After protracted negotiations, Company B agreed
to purchase the oil and gas properties. C Company agreed to
act as the oil payment purchaser and T Bank consented to
lend the necessary funds against a pledge of an oil payment
by C. T Bank's consent and B's purchase were based upon
their analysis of the reserve report. Seventy-five per cent
of the proceeds of the sale of oil and gas were dedicated to
the oil payment and B was to receive the remaining twentyfive per cent.
The evaluated properties fail to produce either the annual
anticipated revenues or the total recoverable reserves stated
by Cursory. T Bank being vindictive by nature elects to
attempt recovery from Cursory. Unfortunately, the domicile
of T Bank's theory for recovery is the legal profession's
semantic wonderland of the law of fraud and negligence. The
semantics involved are that a negligent misrepresentation
bears no liability without privity of contract while the contrary applies to a fraudulent representation; this generalization being modified by an addendum that a grossly negligent
misrepresentation also yields liability. Although the separately stated theories of fraud and negligence be tending to
coalesce,6 and the nuances and shadings of the differentiation
being dissolved; for purposes of this discussion each theory
of T Bank's vendetta will be considered separately.
If T Bank elects a concept based upon the negligence of
Cursory, such negligence would be measured by the standard
of care required by professional practitioners, i.e., "The law
imposes upon persons performing architectural, engineering,
and other professional and skilled services the obligation to
exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill as, under similar
conditions and like surrounding circumstances, is ordinarily
employed by their respective professions."' The rule which
is applied to architects and which is easily equated to other
reasonably prudent professionals, such as petroleum engineers, is:
a person who holds himself out to the public in a
6. See Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (D. Tenn.

1962).

7.

Bodin v. Gill, 216 Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1960). Housing Authority
of City of Carrollton v. Ayers, 211 Ga. 728, 88 S.E.2d 368, 373 (1955).
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professional capacity holds himself to be possessed
of average ability in such profession, and the law
implies that he contracts with his employer (1) that
he possesses that requisite "degree of learning, skill
and experience which is ordinarily possessed by the
profession in the same art or service, and which is
ordinarily regarded by the community, and by those
conversant with that employment, as necessary and
sufficient to qualify him to engage in such business;
(2) that he will use reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the exercise of his skill, in the application of his knowledge, to accomplish the purpose
for which he is employed; (3) in stipulating to exert
his skill and apply his "diligenceand care, an architect
like other professional men, contracts to use his best
judgment.
Depending upon the circumstances, the professional may
be required to possess the "intelligence befitting his profession" ;' however, infallibility is not demanded" and the practitioner, be he architect, engineer, lawyer or accountant, is
entitled to a wide discretion in the selection of methods or
practices in the performance of his work.11
As with any other legally established peer group, the
ambit of professional duty also encompasses its furtherest
8. 6 C.J.S. Architects § 19 n.44 (1937).
9. Lane v. Inhabitants of Town of Harmony, 112 Me. 25, 90 A. 546, 548 (1914).
10. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954):
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.
They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of
members of their profession, and the fa ilure to discharge that duty
will subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire such
persons are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect
only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service, not
insurance.
11. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364, 54 A.L.R.2d 316
(1955).
Ordinarily, the standards of reasonable care which apply to the
conduct of auditors or public accountants are the same as though
applied to lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, and other professional men engaged in furnishing skilled services for compensation. The imposition of such standards does not leave them
without adequate protection since their liability and damages
arises only as the result of methods or practices in the performance of their work which indicate lack of reasonable care, fraud,
or bad faith and since they are entitled to a wide discretion in the
selection of such methods and in determining which of several
practices or principles is most sound or best suited for the work
undertaken by them.
Id., 72 N.W.2d at 367.
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reaches from "standing high in his profession,
sonable negligence and lack of skill."' 3

1

to "unrea-

With the establishment of the median of professional
performance, the next direction of inquiry would be to those
encompassed within the protection of the duty.
In the hypothetical situation, the agreement concerning
the reserve report was between Cursory engineers and A,
the selling company. Neither B, the purchaser, nor C, the
purchaser of the oil payment, nor T Bank was a party to
the agreement. However, Cursory bad actual notice of the
intended use or, if not, constructive notice could easily be
imputed.
Whether T Bank, C, and B are included within the
compass of the duty depends upon privity of contract. Justice
Cardozo considered this question in discussing an accountant's
negligence in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche." In that
case the lender, Ultramares Corporation, attempted recovery
from the accountants, Touche, Niven & Co., for money loaned
on the basis of a certified balance sheet derived from the
falsified books of a bankrupt corporation. Cardozo refused
to extend the duty of the accountants to the lender based upon
negligence.
In Ultramares, as in our hypothetical, the defendants
knew or had cause to know that the result of their labors
wouM be used in a wide variety of instances, such as exhibiting the certificate to banks, creditors, purchasers, etc. Admitting the negligence of the audit, Cardozo states:
A different question develops when we ask whether
they owed a duty to these [the creditors and investors to whom the balance sheet was shown] to make
it without negligence. If liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of decep12. Lane v. Inhabitants of Town of Harmony, supra note 9.
13. 3 AM. JuR. Architects § 19 (1936) :
An architect will also be held responsible for damage sustained by
his employer where, due to unreasonable negligence and lack of
skill, his plans and specifications were faulty and defective. But
his undertaking does not imply or warrant a satisfactory result.
There is no assurance that miscalculations will not occur. Liability
rests only on unskillfulness or negligence, and not upon mere errors
of judgment.
14. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139 (1931).
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tive entries, may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 5
Cardozo found the limits of the accountants' liability to be
bounded by privity of contract"1 and the third party lender

was without the pale of the negligence.
In Ultramares Justice Cardozo made his famous observation to the effect that a favorite subject for juridical 'discussion was the assault upon the citadel of privity. Today,
this citadel resembles a Druid ruin. Even in the area of
professional standards, privity has suffered a minor breach
in that an architect has been found to be liable to a surety
for excess progress payments made by an owner to a contractor upon the architect's evaluation of labor and materials
furnished. Privity was not present between the architect
and the surety." Also, liability apparently exists without
15. Id., 174 N.E. at 444.
16. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra note 14.
Our holding . . . does no more than say that, if less than this is
proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere
profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing
liability for negligence is none that is bounded by the contract,
and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has
been made. We doubt whether the average business man receiving
a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one
among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything
more.
Id. at 448.
17. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Associates, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 951 (D. Minn.
1961). The architect (defendant) had actual or constructive notice of the
surety bond.
Such knowledge added to by the duty of defendant to exercise
reasonable care in certifying bills for payment, as it did, charged
defendant with notice that the retainage fund was not to be
released until the contract had been carried out and concluded,
as provided therein, requiring the contractor to submit satisfactory
proof that all bills and indebtedness had been paid. Privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant was not a pre-requisite
to the existence of the defendant-architect's duty in the foregoing
respect, for the reason that said architect's duty to protect the
owner and the subrogated surety arose out of the general and
mutual contractual arrangements which included resulting independent rights and obligations. Nor is privity of contract a
requisite to make effective said duty, the violation of which
constitutes actionable negligence.
To state it otherwise, defendant-architect understood the performance of professional conduct, which, if negligently performed,
would obviously cause loss to the owner and/or plaintiff-surety.
Under such circumstances, the law imposes upon defendant a duty
to exercise due care to avoid such loss ....
Id. at 954.
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privity between a pipeline owner and an engineer if the
engineer negligently inspects pipe,1 8 and to a subcontractor
if an engineering firm negligently omits pertinent information.19
As a generalization, however, courts refuse to extend
tort liability beyond the immediate employer in the negligent audit type cases.- The limit of liability drawn so expertly by Cardozo in Ultramares has remained essentially
inviolate for 35 years in spite of the destruction of the citadel
in the field of products liability.
In response to the plea of privity, T Bank could argue
that the anachronistic wall of privity separating the protected from the unprotected should be subject to judicial
relocation upon logical and plausible grounds. That while
not advocating recovery without privity in every instance
of negligent professional certification, certainly the first rank
of reliance should be protected from the negligence of the
incompetent professional. That, as in other areas of negligence, the injury to T Bank was a natural and probable
consequence of the negligent evaluation and that the parties
to the purchase transaction would act to their detriment should
have been easily forseen by Cursory. That neither time, nor
amount, nor class is so indeterminate as to absolve the negligent professional engineer from the consequences of his act.
T Bank would have support in this theory by application to
the Texas Tunneling Co. decision. 2
The bank could also
allege that Cursory was in the business of measuring and
certifying oil and gas reserves and was, therefore, liable upon
the doctrine of Glanzer v. Shepard." However, the Glanzer
opinion appears to have been limited by subsequent decisions
and may be a doubtful premise.
18. Getty Oil Co. v. Mills, 204 F. Supp. 179, 187 (W.D. Pa. 1962): "We are
convinced that the lack of privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendant does not absolve defendant from tort liability to plaintiff if the
inspection were negligently performed."
19. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, supra note 6.
20. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d (1938) ; O'Connor
v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 58 U.S. 364; American
Cas. Co. v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n., 223 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Wisc. 1963).
21. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, supra note 6.
22. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425 (1922). A
sold 900 bags of beans to B. A requested C to weigh the beans and issue
a certificate of weight. C was to send the original certificate to A and a
copy to B. C errored in the weighing and B paid A based upon the erroneous
weight. B then sued C alleging negligence. B was allowed to recover.
Justice Cardozo made the following points in the decision: (1) Plaintiff's
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Assuming for a moment that T Bank was successful in
penetrating the privity barrier, it would seem that Cursory
would have a commendable defense, no matter how uncommendable its evaluation, in asserting that the failure of the
reserves was a function of B's production practices. This
being a possible defense, should T Bank join B and Cursory ?
The lending documents supporting the reservation of
the oil payment would furnish the privity necessary between
T Bank and B and would undoubtedly contain numerous
covenants concerning the operation of the properties. "s T
Bank could allege violation of the covenants by B's producing
practices and assert a claim of negligence and breach of
contract. Without privity could B join Cursory as a third
party defendant alleging the lack of production was caused
by improper evaluation of reserves rather than improper
production methods?
As a digression, suppose that A sold the properties for
considerably less than their then present worth based upon
Cursory's incorrect evaluation, would A have a meritorious
claim against Cursory ?
Be that as it may, if Cursory successfully resurrects the
ramparts of privity as a defense for professional negligence,
the next consideration would be fraudulent representation.
In 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3, at 215 (1943) it is stated:
The elements of actionable fraud consist of: (1) a
representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality,
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity and/or
ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should
be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer's ignorance
use of the certificate was not an indirect or collateral consequence but one
which to the weigher's knowledge was the end in aim of the transaction.
(2) One who follows a common calling may come under a duty to another
whom he serves, though a third person may give the order or make the
payment. (3) Defendants did not merely use careless words but carelessly
performed a service-the act of weighing-and then carried it in writing.
The court concluded by saying: "The defendants, acting not casually nor
as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an independent calling weighed and
certified at the order of one with the very end in aim of shaping the
conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but
to him also who relied." Id. 135 N.E. at 277.
23. In the conveyance from A to B of the producing properties, the oil payment
is reserved by A. This conveyance (A to B) typically contains positive
covenants concerning the operation of the properties by B. A then assigns
the reserved oil payment with protective covenants to C, who in turn
assigns payment and covenants to the lending bank.
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11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. III

of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his
right to rely thereon, (9) and his consequent and
proximate injury.
Another statement from the same source is:
That to constitute actionable fraud it must appear:
(1) that defendant made the material representation, (2) that it was false, (3) that when he made it
he knew that it was false, or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive
assertion, (4) that he made it with the intention that
it should be acted on by plaintiff, (5) the plaintiff
reliance on it, (6) that he thereby suffere'd
acted in
24
injury.

Another authority defines the elements to sustain an
action for deceit as being:
That a representation was made as a statement of
fact, which was untrue and known to be untrue by
the party making it, or else recklessly made; that it
was made with intent to deceive and for the purpose
of inducing the other party to act upon it; and that
he did in fact rely on it and2 was induced thereby to
act to his injury or damage. "
Therefore, at the outset our inquiry is whether a reserve
evaluation is a material, false, representation of fact, or a
mere statement of opinion. The former would sustain a cause
of action, the latter would not.2"
The question of fraud eminating from statements concerning the future production from oil and gas properties
has been considered between a buyer and a seller on several
occasions and it has been stated that: "Nothing is more
uncertain than the production of oil wells, and any repre24. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3, at 217 (1943).
25. 23 AM. JUR. Fraud & Deceit § 20 (1939).
26. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 10, at 226 (1943) The general rule is that a mere expression of opinion or a belief or
more precisely a representation which is expressed and understood
as nothing more than a statement of opinion, cannot constitute
fraud. To be actionable, a false representation must be one of fact
as distinguished from an expression of opinion, which ordinarily
is not presumed to deceive or mislead, or influence the judgment
of the hearer, and on which he has no right to rely, since he is
assumed to be equally able to form his own opinion. Thus there can
be no redress for error in representations which are expressed and
understood as mere estimates or judgments, as to, for example, the
capacity of a well, the speed of a horse, the value or character of
a building, or the population of a city.
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sentation as to future production is a mere expression of

opinion as to expectations and probabilities and will not
constitute fraud, even though it turns out to be untrue." 7
However, opinion stated as fact" or an opinion of an
expert" may furnish a sufficient basis for an action for
fraud. In Baker v. Moody"° a lower court instructed the
jury that: "A statement as to how many barrels of oil a well
will, or will not make, is not a statement of presently existing
facts, or, a promise of anything to happen in the future, but,
is merely an opinion, and not the basis of fraud.''"

The

appellate court held this instruction to be incomplete and
noted that the jury should consider all the circumstances
and the evidence as a whole and decide whether the 'defendants
intended that the plaintiff should act on the falsity.
Also, if the misrepresentations relate to extrinsic facts
materially affecting value and the facts are peculiarly within
the seller's knowledge, an opinion statement by such a seller
may gain the status of being sufficient to found an action
in fraud. 2
Referring to the hypothetical situation, we may transmute the negligence of the incorrect reserve report into the
initial elements of a cause for fraud. The report (1) may
constitute a representation whether it is viewed as an expert
opinion or as an opinion stated as fact, (2) is demonstratably
false as shown by subsequent performance, and (3) since
the reserve report is the foundation document of the transaction its materiality may be assumed.
While Cursory may not have had actual knowledge of
the falseness of its report, if Cursory's positive assertion
27.

28.
29.
80.
81.
82.

Engemann v. Allen, 201 Ky. 483, 257 S.W. 25, 2 6(1923) ; Krumholz v. Goff,
315 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1963). In the latter case the buyer also obtained
the following warranty: "First parties represent and warrant that the daily
production in this lease is approximately 400 barrels per day and second
parties rely upon said warranty and representation in entering into this
agreement." Id., 257 S.W. at 26. Production was not 400 barrels as represented and "second parties" attempted to rescind. The court held that
since the "second parties" investigated the production and knew production
was below 400 barrels at the time of purchase there was not sufficient
breach of warranty to allow them to rescind.
Finke v. Boyer, 331 Mo. 1242, 56 S.W.2d 372 (1932); Stonemets v. Head,
248 Mo. 243, 154 S.W. 108 (1913); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, aupra
note 14.
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 10 (1943); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, aupra note 14.
219 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 871.
Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 214 N.Y.S. 452 (1926).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. III

was made recklessly and without knowledge of its accuracy,
a sufficient basis is also provided for the theory in fraud.
In Ultramares Cardozo summarized that:
Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when
knowledge there is none. To creditors and investors
to whom the employer exhibitdd the certificate, the
defendants owed a like duty to make it without
fraud, since there was notice in the circumstances of
its making that the employer did not intend to keep
it to himself.3
The pale then of fraud is far more extensive than that of
negligence and the duty may extend at least to the first line
of lenders and possible purchasers. Cardozo also noted that
negligence, and in particular gross negligence, may support
an inference of fraud.
Considering the whole of the hypothetical and the elements of fraud established, the transmutation to fraud is
relatively complete. Also, if the causes of action for fraud
and negligence are coalescing as appears to be the result in
the Texas Tunneling Co. decision,3" T Bank would be able
to establish a credible cause for recovery upon either a fraud
theory or upon a combined negligence-fraud basis.
The certificate of Cursory should be considered briefly
in passing as a possible 'defense. Cursory certified that it
had evaluated the property based upon information supplied
by the seller, utilizing sound and accepted engineering
practices.
In Texas Tunneling the court considered an express disclaimer which provided that the information was not guaranteed and any bids submitted should be based upon the bidder's
own investigations and determinations. The court held that
since it was customary for contractors to rely on such information the disclaimer would not eliminate the duty of due
care.3 5 However, a certificate providing notice of reliance
upon external sources may absolve the certifier from liability
if the error is traceable to the external source.3" It would seem
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra note 14, 174 N.E. at 444.
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, supra note 6.
Id.
Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934).
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that regardless of the verbiage of the certificate and the
scope of the disclaimer, if the investigation preceding the
certificate was negligently or fraudulently accomplished, it
is probable that the certifier will find slight, if any, shelter
behind the language of its certificate.
The course to recompense that must be traced by the
lender is tenuous at best and it would seem the size of the
equity payment demanded by the lender is the most accessible
vehicle for the protection of the loan. Should the oil and gas
reserves fail to provide sufficient revenues to amortize a
loan secured by a reasonable advance equity payment by
the borrower, the evaluating firm should be held accountable.
If the loss was to be caused by the failure of the lender to
demand a sufficient cash cushion for the loan or, stated
conversely, by the lender advancing an excessive amount
against oil and gas reserves which must be universally known
to be estimates and not absolutes; then the lender, by failing
to protect its own interest, should suffer the resultant loss.
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